We define the notion of a 'de facto fiscal space' of a country as the inverse of the tax-years it would take to repay the public debt. Specifically, we measure the outstanding public debt relative to the de facto tax base, where the latter measures the realized tax collection, averaged across several years to smooth for business cycle fluctuations. We apply this concept to account for the cross-country variation in the fiscal stimulus associated with the global crisis of 2009-2010. We find that greater de facto fiscal space prior to the global crisis, higher GDP/capita, higher financial exposure to the US, and lower trade openness were associated with a higher fiscal stimulus/GDP during 2009-2010. Joint estimation indicates that higher trade openness was associated with lower fiscal stimulus and higher depreciation rate during
Introduction
The dire outlook of the global economy in the second half of 2008 propagated unprecedented fiscal expansions of most OECDs and emerging-market countries. The resultant fiscal stimulus focused attention on the degree to which countries possess 'fiscal space' and on ways to apply it in a counter-cyclical manner. A frequent concern about 'fiscal space' is the lack of clarity about it. In attempts to clarify this fuzzy concept, Heller (2005) defined it "as room in a government's budget that allows it to provide resources for a desired purpose without jeopardizing the sustainability of its financial position or the stability of the economy." Our paper aims at defining a measurable 'fiscal space' variable, and applies this concept in the context of the global crisis.
To proceed, we define concept of a de facto fiscal space as being inversely related to the tax-years it would take to repay the public debt. A useful notion is the de facto tax base, measuring the realized tax collection, averaged across several years to smooth for business cycle fluctuations. The ratio of the outstanding public debt to the de facto tax base, or the tax-years needed to repay the public debt, provides information about the relative fiscal tightness of countries. We apply these concepts in order to explain the cross-country variation in the fiscal stimulus during the aftermath of the global crisis. The pre-crisis tax revenue measures the de facto tax capacity in years of relative tranquility. The presumption is that a lower pre-crisis public debt relative to the pre-crisis tax base implies 1 See Stock and Waston (2002) We apply these concepts in order to explain the cross-country variation in the fiscal stimulus during the aftermath of the global crisis. To recall, the early 2000s were viewed as the continuation of the blissful "Great Moderation" -a period characterized by the drop in macroeconomic volatility and risk premium during the late 1990s and early 2000s. The precrisis tax revenue measures the de facto tax capacity in years of relative tranquility. The presumption is that a lower pre-crisis public debt and lower average fiscal deficits relative to the pre-crisis tax base imply greater fiscal capacity to fund stimuli using the existing tax capacity. loaded fiscal stimulus at rates that were well above the one observed in the OECD countries.
Notable is the greater agility of the emerging markets' response relative to that of the OECD countries, reflecting possibly a faster policy response capacity of several emerging markets.
3
This observation is remarkable considering the earlier evidence of the fiscal pro-cyclicality observed in emerging markets and developing countries during the 1980s-90s [see Kaminsky, Reinhart and (2005) ].
Based on data availability reported in Table 2 , we present in Table 3 We provide in Figure 4 the economic significance of the cross-country estimates in regressions (2) and (5) Table 4 provides results of alternative dependent and explanatory variables. As the fiscal stimulus/GDP is bounded between 0 and 1, we explore the log-odds ratio as the dependent variable in equation (7). As only a third of countries carry out fiscal stimulus from 2009-2010, equation (8) provides the results from a Tobit estimation. Equation (9) was estimated for the sub-sample of countries that engaged in fiscal stimulus. Regressions (7), (8) and (9) support the positive association between fiscal space and the size of stimulus. We also run a regression using the flow fiscal space variable (fiscal deficit/tax revenue in Table 4 
4.

Concluding remarks
Our analysis shows the usefulness of the de facto fiscal space concept in accounting for the size of fiscal stimulus. Intriguingly, we found that higher trade openness had been associated with a lower fiscal stimulus. A possible interpretation is that, as fiscal multipliers may be lower in more open economies, these countries opted for a smaller fiscal stimulus, putting greater weight on adjustment via exchange rate depreciation ('exporting their way to prosperity'). This interpretation is validated in Table 5 , reporting the SUR regression analysis of fiscal stimulus and exchange rate depreciation. We found that greater trade openness is robustly associated with a lower fiscal stimulus and higher depreciation rate during Figure 4 for their economic significance and interpretation). A constant term included but not reported. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses, with standard errors obtained by clustering on geographic region as explained in the paper. *** (**, *) denote a statistical significance at 1 (5, 10) percent, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) - (9) and Fiscal deficit/tax in equations (10) - (12). All variables are deflated using 2006 CPI and rescaled. As Fiscal stimulus/GDP is bounded between 0 and 1, equation (7) explores the log-odds ratio of fiscal space as the dependent variable.
As only a third of countries carry out fiscal stimulus from 2009-2010, equation (8) provides the results from Tobit estimation [the inverse Mills' ratio included]. Equation (9) estimates over only a sample of countries implementing fiscal stimulus. A constant term included but not reported. p-values are in parentheses. *** (**, *) denote a statistical significance at 1 (5, 10) percent, respectively.
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) Table 2 for country-level data. Source: Authors' calculation from the World Development Indicators. 
